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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,

Utah Supreme Court Case No.:
20000205
Utah Court of Appeals Case No.:
990218-CA

vs.
Labor Commission No.: 97-0538
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and
CHARLES TJAS,
Priority 7
Respondents.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petitioners (hereinafter referred to as "Employers") have presented two questions for Review:
" 1. Whether this Court should review this case of first impression in order to establish
the proper legal standard for evaluating the compensability of injuries which occur in
a "work-at-home" circumstance.
2. Whether the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously sanctions an
unreasonably broad legal standard when compared with the majority opinion in the
United States and the standard espoused by Professor Larsen."1
Charles Tjas (hereinafter the "Employee") submits that Petition should be denied for failure
to demonstrate any "special" or "important" reasons why it should be granted. Rather, it seeks to
have this Court create an exception to existing workers compensation law to bar compensation, solely
because an injury occurred at home, although the employee was otherwise entitled to compensation
under existing Utah law, an exception which would be contrary to the clear statutory directive.2
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals, authored by the Hon. Michael J. Wilkins,

Employers' Petition at 1.
2

Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997).

held that the Commission did not err in awarding compensation, under the facts of this case:
"Under the facts of this case, we agree with the Commission that Mr. Tjas's injury
arose from a risk associated with his work for Ae Clevite due to the parties' 'work
at home' arrangement. *** As a general proposition, the Workers' Compensation
Act, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (1997), applies to 'work at home' situations when
a person sustains an injury by an accident 'arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment. Moreover, we hold that under these facts, Mr. Tjas's injury
at his home falls within the category of compensability under section 34Ar2-401
because it was an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment.3
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in this matter on February 10,2000. Petitioner's
filed their Petition seeking a writ of certiorari on March 13, 2000. The Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2 (3) (1) (1999).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997) provides the basic statutory outline for compensability
of injuries to employees, as follows:
"(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: [benefits] * * *" (emphasis added)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Labor Commission, under the specific facts of
this case, must be found to have abused its discretion, to have overstepped "the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality" in its determination that Mr. Tjas was engaged in an activity incidental
to his employment at the time of his injuries. While the case involves issues regarding a "work-athome" situation which has not been previously addressed, it does not involve any issue of "first
'AE Clevite v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App. 035, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22.
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impression" since the determinative statute, as reflected above, provides that Utah's workers'
compensation provisions apply "wherever such injury occurred." Thus, this case presented issues
which, as the Commission and the Court of Appeals determined, had previously been addressed,
albeit with regard to injuries at other locations.
Employers denied Employee's application for worker's compensation, claiming it did not
"arise out of and in the course of' his employment. The parties waived a formal hearing and
submitted their Briefs based upon deposition testimony relative to the legal issues presented in the
case, along with the written and video taped deposition of Mr. Tjas, so that the demeanor of the
witness could be observed. In addition, the parties stipulated as to the facts of the case.4 Judge
Elicerio entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 22,1998, granting Mr.
Tjas' claim. A Motion for Review was filed and briefed by the parties and the Labor Commission
issued its Order5 on February 26,1999, similarly finding that Mr. Tjas' was entitled to compensation
because his activity in salting the driveway, under the particular circumstances of this case, was
"reasonably incidental" to his employment and that his injuries arose "out of and in the course of his
employment. Employers filed their Motion for Review with the Court of Appeals on March 15,1999,
and their docketing statement on April 1,1999. Briefs were timely filed by Employers, with opposing
Briefs filed separately by Mr. Tjas and the Labor Commission, with a Reply Brief by Employer. Oral
argument was held on January 24, 2000. The Court's opinion was issued on February 10, 2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The determination of whether a particular activity is within the scope of employment is highly
fact-dependent. "Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether or not the injury arises out of
4

See Order of Judge Elicerio, attached as Exhibit "A-3" to the Employers' Petition.

5

See Order Denying Motion for Review, attached as Exhibit "A-2" to Employers' Petition.
-3-

or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case.'"6 The particular
facts of this case, carefully reviewed by both the Commission and the Court of Appeals, as set forth
in the Commission's Findings of Fact, included:
"Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as a district
sales manager for Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana and parts of Nevada. Clevite did
not maintain an office in Salt Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal
residence as a base of operations for his work. To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas
with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and answering machine for use in
his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were delivered by
U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr.
Tjas with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday
through Thursday and performed office work at home on Friday.
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In
winter, the driveway is sometimes slick from snow or ice and, consequently, is
hazardous to cars and pedestrians. It was Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snow
from the driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface.
The night before Mr. Tjas' accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake
City. The next morning, Monday, January 13, 1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local
sales calls, but did not first clear the snow from his sidewalk and driveway. Instead,
Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas was making his sales calls. However,
the driveway remained icy.
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading
his car with material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by
Clevite to expect delivery of a large package to be used in connection with the trip.
Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by
a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be delivered that day or the
next. Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching he decided to
spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and
make his delivery to the Tjas residence.
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury
for which he now seeks workers' compensation benefits."7

6

State Tax Common v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P. 2d 1051 , 1053 (Utah, 1984).

1

Supra, Note 5 at 3.
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These facts are supported by the Record and not disputed by Employers.8 However, in Employers'
Statement of Facts, they have selectively set forth additional facts upon which they rely, some of
which are inaccurate or misleading, without marshaling the additional facts supporting that decision.
For instance, Employers' assert that, "Mr. Tjas was aware that a city ordinance required all
homeowners to clear snow and ice from their sidewalks and driveways"9 when Mr. Tjas' testimony
only addressed the clearing of "snow" off the "sidewalks." Further, the ordinance requires only that
snow be cleared from "sidewalks", without addressing either "ice" or "driveways". Employers'
claims that in his application for long term disability, "Mr. Tjas specifically affirmed that his injury was
not work-related and he did not intend to file a workers' compensation claim (R. 70),"10 is also
misleading. Mr. Tjas testified that he did not, and could not, have signed any such document since
he has been unable to use his arms or hands since his injury. Rather, that document would have been
provided to his wife for her review and signature (R. 276, pp. 65-67). The Application for Hearing
with the Utah Labor Commission was not filed until June 27, 1997, after Mrs. Tjas had an
opportunity to review his rights with an attorney knowledgeable in the workers compensation field.
Other facts which Employers failed to marshal in their Petition included:
1. AE Clevite chose not to have Mr. Tjas work out of a company plant or building. Rather,
he was required to travel from an office established at his home to his customers as part of his
employment. In a normal week he traveled Monday through Thursday and then worked in his home
office on Friday. (R. 276, p. 13) Mr. Tjas also did some work every day on his computer. (R. 276,

8

See Employers' Docketing Statement, paragraph 8 (b) which states, "This appeal concerns
the Labor Commission's application of law to the particular facts of this case."
9

Supra, Note 1 at 7.

10

A/. atlO.
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pp. 53, 61) He was required to work 40 or more hours per week. (R. 276, p. 19) He normally
worked until 7:00 p.m. each day. (R. 276, p. 53)
2. Mr. Tjas' only office address was 2467 Emerson, Salt Lake City, Utah, his home address.
(R. 276, p. 52) His employer provided him with a company car which was to be kept at his home
office. (R. 276, p. 18) His employer also provided him with a company computer and printer to be
used at his home office and covered telephone expenses and other expenses involved with its
operation. (R. 276, p. 61 and R. 275, p. 10) A separate company phone line and a separate company
phone and answering machine were also maintained in conjunction with the office at Mr. Tjas' home.
(R. 276, pp. 53, 54) The work area was spread out in the basement with big shelves with lots of
company catalogs, price sheets and other information. (R. 276, p. 11) His work at the home office
included preparation for sales calls and notes of items to be discussed with particular customers,
reviewing which of the 200 price sheets and catalogues were needed, and loading those items into
his company car. (R. 276, pp. 55-57) Company mail and materials were also regularly received at
his home office. (R. 276, p. 49)
3. Mr. Tjas was to leave on Wednesday, January 15, 1997, to Montana for an automotive
engine parts show as part of his duties. He returned early from his sales calls at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. on
January 13, 1997, to prepare the appropriate catalogs and price sheets for the show and to wait for
the company display for the show which he expected to arrive in the mail that day. (R. 276, p. 33)
He began loading and organizing the trunk of his car with the appropriate catalogs and price sheets.
(R. 276, p. 37) After loading the car and closing the trunk, Mr. Tjas went up the driveway to his
home, still waiting for the arrival of the company display, and, almost immediately after that, saw the
mailman coming up the street. (R. 276, p. 39)
4. The mailman parked his truck across the street from Mr. Tjas' house and proceeded to
-6-

deliver the mail up the far side of the street on the dead end circle and then turned back down Mr.
Tjas' side of the street. (R. 276, p. 42) Although Mr. Tjas had no way to know for sure if the
company display would arrive that day, or if it would be coming through the U.S. Mails or other
courier service, he reasonably expected, based on conversations with the representative who was
sending the package, that the package would arrive that day and knew it could be coming by U.S.
Mail. (R. 276, pp. 50, 59, 60) The company display Mr. Tjas was expecting is about three feet long
and one-half foot wide and is awkward and fairly heavy. (R. 276, pp. 50, 58) Mr. Tjas' mailbox is
attached to his house next to his door. The postman would have to go up the driveway to get to the
mailbox. (R. 276, pp. 28, 29)
5. Mr. Tjas endeavored to keep his driveway salted, as well as shoveled, and his son generally
shoveled it during the week and Mr. Tjas endeavored to salt it when he was around. However, he
acknowledged, "It depended on the mood I was in and what happened that week. It wasn't a set
thing, but I tried to do it." (R. 276, p. 59)
6. Because of the awkward, heavy nature of the company display he was expecting, Mr. Tjas
was particularly concerned that he needed to salt the driveway for the mailman. (R. 276, p. 58) He
picked up a nearly empty 50 pound bag of salt, and began to salt his driveway when he saw the
mailman coming. (R. 276, p. 39-40) The driveway did not appear to be slippery to him, although it
had been windy and had left "a little skiff here and there" of snow. However, when Mr. Tjas reached
the steep part of his driveway, he slipped and fell backwards, landing on his neck. (R. 276, p. 42)
At the time of the fall, the mailman was close enough that he rushed to Mr. Tjas, then told Mrs. Tjas
to call 911. (R. 276, p. 42, 43) Mr. Tjas has since been diagnosed with C3-4 Quadriplegia.
7. The company display did not arrive on January 13, 1997 as expected. Rather it arrived
the next day. (R. 276, p. 64)
-7-

Based on the totality of the facts in this case, the Commission properly determined that Mr.
Tjas' activity when he "spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the
driveway and make his delivery to the Tjas residence," was "reasonably incidental" to his
employment, where Mr. Tjas needed that anticipated delivery for a forthcoming business trip. Those
facts reflected that his activity was reasonably intended to advance, directly or indirectly, his
employer's interests so as to constitute an activity arising "out of and in the course o f employment.
That "causal relationship"at the time of the injury was sufficient support for the award.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT ANY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE
LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT.
The sole issue presented to the Court of Appeals for review was whether the Labor
Commission abused its discretion by determining that Mr. Tjas' slip and fall accident on January 13,
1997, was an accident which "arose out of and in the course o f his employment, where it occurred
while he was salting his icy driveway in an effort to ensure that an approaching postman would be
able to safely negotiate his driveway to make delivery of large and awkward business package, which
Mr. Tjas reasonably believed might be delivered that day, and which he required before he could leave
on a forthcoming sales trip.
The standard of review on such matters is clearly established. "The commission has the duty
and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter
or any other title or chapter it administers."1 ] The Commission's discretion in regard to such Orders
is extremely broad, its Findings and Conclusions are entitled to great deference, and its Conclusions

ll

Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997).
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are reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, in which the Court determines whether the
Order exceeds "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."12 In this case, no showing of any such
"abuse of discretion" was made. When all of the facts of the case are reviewed, there is a sufficient
factual basis upon which the Commission could have found that Mr. Tjas' activities were reasonably
"incidental to" his employment, at the time of the injury. Mr. Tjas' activity was motivated by a
substantial business purpose when he was salting his driveway. He was expecting delivery that day
of a large, bulky and awkward business package to his residence, which he required for forthcoming
business trip and which he reasonably believed the postman might be delivering that day. When he
saw the postman coming, Mr. Tjas became concerned that the postman might not be able to get up
the icy driveway with that awkward package and, to ensure that the delivery could be made, he began
salting the driveway, at which time he slipped, fell and was severely injured.
Employers now seek to have this Court engraft an exception to Utah's determinative statute,
so that it would provide coverage "wherever such injury occurred," unless such an injury occurred
at a home. Such an exception has never been the law in this state or in any other state, and there
appears no reason why this Court should consider establishing any such exception.
Employers assert that this is a case of "first impression" but, due to the particular nature of
worker's compensation law, most such cases are "cases of first impression." The Commission's
statutory duties entail looking at each of those cases, and their unique underlying facts, to determine
whether the injuries are compensable in line with the determinative statutory provisions and guidelines
established by existing case law, "wherever such injury occurred." The Commission and the Court
properly applied those provisions and guidelines under Utah law to Mr. Tjas' "work-at-home"
situation, the same as they would have been applied to an injury occurring at any other location.
]2

Osman Home Imp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P. 2d 240, 242 (Ut. App., 1998).
-9-

Employers' "Questions Presented for Review" fail to set forth any questions involving any
"special" or "important" reasons why the Petition should be granted, as reflected in Rule 46, Utah
R. App. P. The decision is neither in conflict with any decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals nor with any decision of this Court. The decision neither departs, nor sanctions any
departure, from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings. The decision does not involve
any issue of state law which has not been settled by this Court. Neither does the Petition set forth
any other "special and important reason" appear why this Court should grant that Petition.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION PROPERLY RECOGNIZES THAT
AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES
RECEIVED WHICH ARE "REASONABLY INCIDENTAL" TO HIS
EMPLOYMENT AND DID NOT SANCTION ANY "UNREASONABLY
BROAD" APPLICATION OF UTAH'S WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT.
The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as the Commission had previously, that Mr. Tjas'
injuries arose "out of and within the course o f his employment. The employer had an arrangement
with Mr. Tjas to maintain the company office at his home, fully supplied by the employer, and where
he maintained substantial shelves of work-related materials and regularly engaged in work for his
employer. Company mail, catalogues and price lists were maintained at his home and were regularly
forwarded to Mr. Tjas by U.S. Mail or courier. Given those circumstances, combined with Mr. Tjas'
endeavors to secure the business package he required from the postman, it was properly determined
that Mr. Tjas' injuries at home were "reasonably incidental" to his employment. The Court also
properly recognized that "reasonably incidental," as used by the Commission, was not synonymous
with "relatively insignificant" or "tangentially related," as argued by Employers. Rather, it referred
to an activity which, while not actually part of the employee's regular duties, was nevertheless of
some benefit or advantage to the employer or advanced the employers' interests, so as to constitute
an injury "arising out of and in the course o f employment. As the Court explained:
-10-

"In other words, Mr. Tjas's act of salting the driveway was motivated in-part by a
purpose to benefit Ae Clevite and thus was reasonably incidental, rather than
tangentially related, to his employment. As such, the Commission correctly concluded
that Mr. Tjas's injuries arose 'in the course of his employment".13
Utah Courts have awarded compensation in a number of cases in which the activities in which
the employee was involved at the time of the injury were reasonably "incidental" to the employment,
as that term was used by the Commission and the Court in Mr. Tjas' case. The determination of
whether such an activity is "incidental to" the employment is determined under the particular facts
of each case, regardless of the type of activity involved or "wherever such injury occurred."14
Employers' now claim, for the first time in this Writ, that Mr. Tjas' claim is based on his
mental intent at the time and declare that "Mental intent has never been, nor should it be, a sufficient
basis for awarding workers compensation benefits."1- Contrary to that broad declaration, Utah case
law is replete with awards of compensation based upon an employees' intent to engage in an act for
the benefit of his employer or an act otherwise "incidental to" his or her employment.
In Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'nJ 6 this Court upheld compensation for an
employee killed while returning home after an evening at the governor's ball with his employer. The
Court based its decision on the mental intent of the employee, explaining that the award was
appropriate where the employee had believed the governor's ball event would present an opportunity
to discuss some business issues with his employer, even though no business was discussed that
evening, and although the employer had considered the evening solely as a social affair.
A few of the other cases where the award was based on the employee's mental intent include:
u

Supra, Note 3.

,4

Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1997).

15

Employers' Petition, Page 15.

16

663 P. 2d 88 (Utah, 1983).
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Kahn Brothers v. Industrial Comm'nJ 7 where the employee's mental intent was to drive to the post
office to pick up his employer's mail; Kinne v. Industrial Comm'nJl where the employee's mental
intent was to drive to a specified location to pick up a trailer; and Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n..19
where the employee's mental intent was to take his station wagon to work because it was regularly
used at work for emergency calls or temporary use of customers. In each of those cases, the alleged
mental intent of the employee, supported by the surrounding facts, was the basis for the recovery
since intervening accidents precluded the employees from engaging in the anticipated activities on
behalf of the employer. None of those cases rested upon questions of whether there was actually any
mail waiting at the post office, any trailer waiting to be picked up, or any customer who sought use
of the station wagon at work on that particular day. What may have actually existed in hindsight did
not matter, so long as the employee had the mental intent of serving the employer's interests.
In fact, if mental intent were not a sufficient bases for an award, the entire line of "dual
purpose" cases could not exist. Yet that significant exception to the "going and coming" rule has
been clearly established under Utah law and allows compensation where an employee is engaged in
an activity in which there is some real or substantial benefit intended for the employer, even though
he may also have a substantial personal purpose for engaging in that activity, so long as the
employment-related purpose is not merely a minor factor or afterthought20. Whitehead 21 does not
support any contrary determination since it merely involved an employee who was driving home for

17

75 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054 (1929).

18

609 P. 2d 926 (Utah, 1980).

,9

16 Utah 2d 208, 398 P. 2d 545 (Utah, 1965).

20

Supra, Note 16. See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah, 1991).

21

Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life, 801 P. 2d 934 (Utah, 1989).
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supper when the injury occurred and his claim that he intended to make some calls after supper was
found to be immaterial since there was no indication that those calls could not have been made from
a location other than the home. Martinson22 similarly reflects no contrary determination. It simply
involved an adverse credibility determination in which the Commission rejected the employee's
assertions regarding his mental intent, in view of the totality of the facts.
The guidelines applied by the Commission and the Court of Appeals to Mr. Tjas' award,
contrary to Employers' assertions, were simply the same standard guidelines which have regularly
been applied in prior Utah workers compensation cases. The Court of Appeals' decision does not
herald "broad and sweeping" changes to the Utah compensation laws. The Court merely chose to
reject Employers' demands for a "broad and sweeping" change to exclude only work-at-home injuries
from the determinative statutes and existing Utah workers' compensation case law. The Court's
decision was short and to the point because there was nothing so unique or unusual in this case as not
to be adequately governed by existing Utah law.
Given the fact that Mr. Tjas reasonably believed that the work-related package he was
expecting might be delivered by the postman that day, he had a clear work-related reason for salting
the driveway in the manner and at the time he did, resulting in his injury. The fact that Mr. Tjas
might have undertaken to salt the driveway at other various times for his own purposes does not
mean that he could not have been doing so at the time of his injury for business purposes. Awards of
compensation have been entered in numerous circumstances for injuries to employees which were
suffered while crossing a street or driving home which, at the time of the injury, was for business
purposes. The approach of Employers in this case would have denied compensation in all such cases,
since those employees had obviously crossed the street or driven home at other times when it
22

Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency. Inc.. 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah, 1980)
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involved only personal activities. The question which the Commission was required to resolve in this
case, as with other such cases, was whether at the particular time of the injury, the activity of the
Employee was motivated by some business purpose. In Mr. Tjas' case, the Commission concluded:
"In light of the foregoing, under the specific facts of this case, Mr. Tjas's efforts to
make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the
performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while
salting his driveway arise i n the course' of his employment for Clevite." 23
In rendering their decisions, the Commission and the Court of Appeals properly relied upon
the basic standards which have previously been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court with regard to
workers compensation awards in general. As they recognized, this Court in Buczynski v. Industrial
Common,24 before entering into any discussions concerning the effect and application of the
"continuous coverage" rule in Utah, addressed "Compensability in General," explaining as follows:
"Under Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course' of employment when it 'occurs
while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or
doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was
authorized to render such service.'" M & K Corp., v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah
488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948) (emphasis added).
An accident arises out of employment 'when there is a 'causal relationship' between
the injury and the employment' Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n, 888 P. 2d
707, 712 (Utah Ct. App., 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah at 493, 189 P. 2d
at 134) cert, denied 899 P. 2d 1231 (Utah, 1995). "'Arising out of,' however, does not
mean that the accident must be 'caused by' the employment; rather, the employment
'is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises than as the force
producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" Commercial Carriers, 888 P. 2d at 712
(quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §6.60, at 3-9
(1994) (emphasis in quoted treatise)."25
Those statements by this Court were not limited to "continuous coverage" cases. Further, they

s

Supra, Note 5 at 4.

^934 P. 2d 1169 (Utah App., 1997).
'Id. at 1172.
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accurately summarized the prior cases referenced therein which, similarly, were not "continuous
coverage" cases.

That quotation properly reflects the state of Utah's law with regard to

"Compensability in General" and the reliance of the Commission and the Court of Appeals upon that
quotation was not misplaced.
Neither the Commission nor the Utah Court of Appeals have determined in this case that an
activity which is "merely incidental" to employment is sufficient to justify an award of compensation,
to the extent that term is used synonymously with "minimal", "relatively insignificant" or only
"tangentially related to" the employment. Rather, they both acknowledged that injuries which are
only "tangentially related to work" are not compensable. They further recognized, however, that
there is a significant difference between an activity in such a minimal category as opposed to an
activity which is "incidental to" or "reasonably incidental to" the employment, as in M & KCorp.
v. Industrial Comm'n.26 In short, "An injury occurs in the 'course of employment' when it takes
place, 'while she is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doings something incidental thereto.'"27
Similar usages of the term "incidental to" employment may be found in Black v. McDonalds28;
Hafer's Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n29; Birkner v. Industrial Comm'n30; Christensen v. Swenson3I; and
Christensen v. Swenson.32

26

112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948).

27

Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. 857 P. 2d 964, 967 (Utah App., 1993).

28

733P. 2d 154, 156 (Utah, 1987)

29

526 P. 2d 1188, 1189 (Utah, 1974).

30

771 P. 2d 1053, 1056 (Utah, 1989).

31

844 P. 2d 992, rev'd 874 P. 2d 125, 127 (Utah, 1994).

32

Christensen v. Swenson. 844 P. 2d at 994.
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What this language truly reflects, in the manner utilized by the Utah Courts, is that there needs
to be a "causal relationship" between the relationship and the employment, i.e. an intended benefit
to the employer33.

The particular facts of Mr. Tjas' case, demonstrated that there was such a

reasonable "causal connection" between Mr. Tjas activity at the time of his injur/ and his
employment, and not merely some "tangential" relationship.
In view of the guidelines previously established under Utah law, which are equally applicable
to the injuries suffered by Mr. Tjas, there is little reason for this Court to examine the case law of
other jurisdictions. However, other jurisdictions have similarly granted compensation to workers
injured at home where those injuries were "reasonably incidental," as opposed to merely "tangential"
to their employment, following the same guidelines as those previously discussed herein. Thus, while
compensation may have been denied for an employee who fell down the stairs at home while carrying
a book from work34, compensation was awarded for another employee who took books and files
home to prepare for a client interview the next day and was injured coming down the stairs at home
while carrying the books because they slipped and she lost her balance and fell grabbing for them35.
While compensation was denied for an employee who was at home on call and fell off a ladder trying
to answer a phone call (based on the Court's declaration that there was no showing it was the
employer who was calling)36 compensation was granted for another employee on call who was
carrying decorations down her stairs at home and was injured trying to answer a phone call (based
on the Court's declaration that it was not reasonable to expect an employee to know if it was the

33

Askren v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 275, 276, 391 P. 2d 302, 303 (Utah, 1964).

34

Glasser v. Youth Shop, Inc., 54 So. 2d 686 (Fla., 1951).

35

Moore v. Family Service of Charleston, 237 S.E. 2d 84 (So. Carol., 1977).

36

Lovd v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 280 S.W. 2d 955 (Tex. App., 1955)
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employer calling without first answering the phone37. While compensation may have been denied for
an employee who suffered a heart attack in the morning attempting to get the family truck freed from
a snowbank so he could get the family car into the garage to load his suitcase for a business trip he
was to take on an airplane trip late that afternoon (an activity which the court determined was simply
too far distant from that special mission to be reasonably causally related to the employment),38
compensation was granted for another employee who suffered a heart attack, during a blizzard, while
attempting to shovel the deep snow out of the driveway so he could get to work for an important
meeting, as requested by his vice-president.39 While compensation may have been denied for an
employee injured going out the door of his home to drive his truck to work, despite the fact that he
had the truck at home for possible 24 hour deliveries (the Court declaring that he would have had to
drive to work regardless)40 compensation was granted for an employee who was injured while going
from his house to his truck with the intent of making deliveries.41 In fact, Utah law would likely have
awarded compensation under the facts of either of these latter two cases.42
Other cases relied upon by Employers have followed the same guidelines as would have been
applied under existing Utah law. Under the particular fact situations of those cases, as opposed to
the facts in this case, the activities in which the employees were engaged at the time of their injuries
were not reasonably incidental to their employment, so compensation was denied for: a laid-off
37

American Red Cross v. Wilson, 519 S. W. 2d 60 (Ark., 1975)

38

0wen v. Chrysler Corporation, 371 N.W. 2d 519 (Mich. App., 1985).

39

Junium v. A.L. Bazzini Company, Inc, 446 N.Y.S. 2d 520 (N.Y., 1982).

40

Russellville Gas Co. v. Duggar, 260 So. 2d 393 cert, den. 260 So. 2d 395 (Ala., 1971).

41

Black River Dairy Prod., Inc., v. Dept. of Ind., Labor & Human Relations, 207 N.W. 2d 65
(Wis., 1973).
42

Moser v. Industrial Common, 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P. 2d 23 (1968).
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employee who had a heart attack at home following a conversation with his former employer (and
who the commission found was performing absolutely no service for the employer whatsoever at the
time of his injury)43; a motel manager injured in a fall on her day off on a walkway outside her
apartment door, while leaving to go shopping for groceries44; an employee who was told to dispose
of some plants at her workplace, and who decided to dispose of them by taking them home and was
injured while standing on a chair, trying to hang those plants at her home (an activity which the court
found was so far removed from mere disposition of the plants as to be "not for the benefit of her
employer to any appreciable extent'')45; an employee injured while blowing leaves from his driveway
with an electrical device he brought from work and modified for his own use (where the claim that
he was "testing" the device for his employer was rejected by the Commission due to the surrounding
facts)46; a custodian of a church who was injured while going down the steps of his home, and which
was provided by his employer, to select a place to store his old refrigerator (an act which the court
specifically found to be a purely personal purpose and "not incidental to his employment").47
On the other hand, where cases from other jurisdictions have involved facts reflecting that the
employee was engaged in an activity which was reasonably incidental to the employment at the time
of the injury, compensation has been granted for: an employee injured in a fall off a ladder while
painting a home, which was also regularly used as the company's office;48 a pizza salesman who
43

Ralph's Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (Cal. App., 1997).

44

Roberts v. Stell 367 N. W. 2d 198 (S.D., 1985).

45

Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co., 349 S.E. 2d 296, 298 (N.C. Ct. App., 1986).

46

Quaglino v. Ace Bakery Division of Lakeland Bakers, Inc., 275 So. 2d 874 (La. App.,

1973).
47

Fingers v. Mt. Tabor United Church of Christ. 439 S.W. 2d 241 (Mo., 1969)

48

Brogger v. Kezer, 626 P. 2d 700 (Colo. App., 1980).
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regularly worked out of his home and who was injured when he slipped and fell as he was walking
from his home to his truck49; a registered nurse who was injured when she slipped and fell on ice in
her own walkway as she was returning home from a client visit, where she regularly worked out of
her home50; a news reporter injured while traveling between home, where preparatory work was
regularly required to be performed, and the station51; an employee injured during travel from home
to another work site where the regularity and quantity of the work at home had made it part of the
work premises52; an employee injured while shoveling snow to remove an obstacle to exiting his home
to visit customers53; an off duty employee injured when he stepped on a rake while walking to his car
at home in order to respond to a report of a broken telephone pole 54; a nurse injured when she
slipped on wet grass while walking to her car from a residential facility preparatory to travel to her
next client;55 and even a bookkeeper who regularly performed her duties in her own home on her
couch before going to bed each night and who was injured when she attempted to move a shotgun,
which someone had left on that couch earlier in the day, so that she could perform her work.56
CONCLUSION
Employers have failed to establish any reason why this Court should exercise its discretion

49

Supra,Note4l.

50

Jones v. W.C.A.B.. 489 A. 2d 1006 (Pa. Comm., 1985).

5{

Wilson v. Service Broadcasters. 483 So. 2d 1339 (Miss., 1986)

52

Kavcee Coal Co. v. Short. 450 S.W. 2d 262, 265 (Ct. App., Ky, 1970).

53

Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 630 A. 2d 136 aff d 642 A. 2d 721 (Conn., 1994).

54

Hughes v. New York Telephone Co.. 472 N.Y.S. 2d 513 (N.Y., 1984).

55

Hollman v. Comfort Care. Inc., 1999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 58 (Okla. App., 1999)

56

Joe Ready's Shell Station and Cafe v. Ready. 65 So. 2d 268, 270 (Miss., 1953).
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to accept Employers' Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case, within the guidelines established
under Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. and the same should be rejected. The particular facts of this case
clearly support the Commission's award to Mr. Tjas since he was, indeed, salting the driveway at the
time of his injury for the specific purpose of allowing the postman to safely negotiate the driveway
and make his delivery of the expected large, bulky and awkward business package to the Tjas
residence, which Mr. Tjas reasonably believed the postman may be delivering that day. The
Commission's decision, therefore, cannot be said to have exceeded "the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality."
Employers have failed to reflect any reason why this Court should consider engrafting an
exception to existing Utah law. The exception they seek would bar compensation for an injury, solely
because it occurred at a home, despite the fact that the employee was engaged in an activity which
was reasonably incidental to the employment at the time of the injury and, therefore, the injury "arose
out of and in the course of the employment." Such an exception has never been the law of this State
nor of any other state, and establishment of such an exception would, indeed, constitute a "broad and
sweeping" change to our existing worker's compensation system.
Respectfully submitted this ^s

day of March, 2000.
ATKIN & ASSOCIATES

Charles Tjas
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